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Effective July 1, 1990, the Florida Legislature revamped Florida's
corporate law by enacting the Florida Business Corporation Act.' Ex-
cept for provisions concerning foreign corporations doing business in
Florida, the Act generally applies only to corporations incorporated in
Florida.2 The Act repeals the Florida General Corporation Act,3 and
with significant exceptions, adopts the Revised Model Business Corpo-
ration Act.4 This article addresses the financial provisions in chapter VI
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Florida Legislature.
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this article.
1. Florida General Corporation Act, 1991 Fla. Laws 154, (codified as amended
at FLA. STAT. § 607 (1990)) [hereinafter the Act]. The Act arose from a proposal
prepared by a subcommittee of the Corporations and Securities Committee of The
Florida Bar chaired by Thomas R. McGuigan of Steel, Hector & Davis and Stuart D.
Ames of Weil, Gotshal & Manges, which was enacted with few modifications. In 1990,
before it became effective, the Act was amended for technical corrections. See 1990
Fla. Laws 179.
2. One exception to this general rule is section 607.0902, the control shares ac-
quisitions statute, which covers some corporations that have their principal office or
place of business in Florida but are not necessarily incorporated in Florida. See FLA.
STAT. § 607.0902 (1990).
3. FLA. STAT. § 607 (1989) (repealed 1990) (generally referred to as the "prior"
or "former" law).
4. REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT (1984) [hereinafter RMBCA]. The
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of the Act-those governing capital structure, issuances of equity se-
curities, and distributions.5
The Act's financial provisions principally are set forth in sections
607.0601 through 607.06401.8 These provisions are a credit to the
Act's drafters and the drafters of sections 6.01 through 6.40 of the
RMBCA, on which they are based, because they are more simple, logi-
cal, and flexible, and better attuned to commercial and economic real-
ity than the former law.7 The Act scraps complex, cumbersome, and
unnecessary concepts and limitations of the former law, adopts current
scholarly thoughts on corporate capital structure, and brings Florida
the benefits of conforming to the RMBCA, which is likely to be widely
adopted among the states. One commentator notes the benefits of
adopting the RMBCA as follows:
The advantages of following the national model are obvious. The
provisions have been thoroughly considered by a number of very
prominent practitioners and scholars. The Official Comments to
each section of the Model Act should serve as a guide to the inter-
RMBCA reflects a complete revision of the Model Business Corporation Act developed
over a five-year period by the Committee on Corporate Laws of the Section of Corpora-
tion, Banking and Business Law of the American Bar Association and completed in
1984. The RMBCA is "designed to be a convenient guide for revision of state business
corporation statutes, reflecting current views as to the appropriate accommodation of
various commercial and societal interests involved in modern business corporations."
MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT ANN. xxiii (1990) [hereinafter MBCAA].
This article occasionally refers to the official comment that accompanies the
RMBCA (the "official comment") and to the commentary to the Act that was pre-
pared by its drafters. The official comment is set forth in the MBCAA, supra, and the
drafters' commentary on the Act are compiled in T. O'BRIEN, FLORIDA LAW OF COR-
PORATIONS AND BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS (1990).
5. To limit its scope and length, this article does not address in detail the follow-
ing matters that the author considered more or less peripheral to the principal subjects:
fractional shares, subscriptions for shares, shareholders' preemptive rights, restrictions
on transfers of shares, form and content of certificates, share voting rights (including
voting groups), and directors' fiduciary duties in connection with the cerporation's issu-
ance and its repurchase of shares. This article also generally does not address other
state and federal laws that apply to these matters, such as the laws governing the sale
of securities and the corporation's repurchase of its securities.
6. FLA. STAT. § 607.0601-.06401 (1990).
7. Persons following the federal tax "simplification" efforts of the 1980's might
be skeptical, but please continue reading. Except for section 6.22, which is based on the
former law and concerns shareholders' liability for shares issued before payment, the
Act generally adopts the RMBCA, supra note 4. As discussed in this article, the Act
modifies those provisions in some respects.
[Vol. 151320
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pretation of the Revised Statute's provisions. The evolving case law
from jurisdictions having substantially the same provisions can be
persuasive authority in the interpretation and application of the
Revised Statute."
The Act also facilitates the adoption of anti-takeover measures by Flor-
ida corporations. Corporations considering Florida incorporation should
evaluate the Act favorably.
The changes affecting the financial provisions that are discussed in
this article were part of revolutionary amendments to the Model Busi-
ness Corporation Act made in 1980 and 1984.1 In particular, these
amendments: (a) eliminated the established concepts of par value,
stated capital, and treasury shares; (b) eliminated limitations on ac-
ceptable consideration for sales of shares; (c) eliminated specific refer-
ences to "common" and "preferred" shares in recognition of the blur-
ring between those types of shares that has occurred in the market
place; and (d) adopted uniform rules governing all transactions in
which consideration is paid to shareholders with respect to their shares,
called distributions. The objectives of most of the changes were to elim-
inate obsolete and ineffective restrictions, and to allow the corporation,
its creditors, and shareholders to freely determine their relationship
through negotiation and contract. This article analyzes these and other
more subtle changes, their policy underpinnings and practical implica-
tions, and several omissions and inconsistencies in the financial provi-
sions of the Act that are proposed for revision in a bill pending before
the Florida Legislature.
Although the Act's financial provisions are derived from the
RMBCA, the provisions actually enacted by the Florida Legislature in
the Act vary in significant respects from the RMBCA. The most im-
portant substantive variances are in section 607.0601(1) and section
607.0624(2). Section 607.0601(1) omits a sentence requiring that all
shares of a class be granted equal rights, limitations, and preferences,
except for variations caused by series. 10 Section 607.0624(2) confirms
8. Murphy, The New Virginia Stock Corporation Act: A Primer, 20 U. RICH. L.
REV. 67 (1985).
9. The premier authority on the legal guidelines governing corporate capital
structures observes that following these changes, the new law "is substantially at vari-
ance with the learning that today's judges and practitioners gained when they were in
law school." Manning, Assets In and Assets Out: Chapter VI of the Revised Model
Business Corporation Act, 63 TEx. L. REV. 1527 (1985).
10. FLA. STAT. § 607.0601(l) (1990).
1991] 1321
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the validity of poison pill devices involving rights that discriminate
against persons acquiring more than a certain number of shares."1 Both
modifications facilitate use of anti-takeover defenses.
II. WHAT'S AVAILABLE ON THE SHELF-AUTHORIZED SHARES
AND BLANK CHECK AUTHORIZATION (SECTION 607.0601 AND
SECTION 607.0602)
Authorized shares are the shares of all classes that the corporation
is authorized to issue as set forth in its articles of incorporation. 2 The
Act generally requires that shareholders approve amendments to the
articles of incorporation that increase the number of authorized shares
or change the terms of any shares that have been issued. 13 Conse-
quently, authorized shares are the limit of what is available "on the
shelf" for directors to issue to raise capital for the corporation.' 4 The
number and terms of authorized shares vitally concern shareholders be-
cause each authorized share represents potential dilution of their inter-
ests in the corporation (voting, dividends, liquidation rights) and will
reduce their share value if earnings from the capital raised do not offset
the increase in the number of shares.
Section 607.0601 prescribes what may be in the articles of incor-
poration concerning authorized shares.' 5 Section 607.0602 permits a
corporation to delegate to the board of directors authority to establish
the terms of classes and series of shares before they are issued.' 6
A. Authorized Shares (Section 607.0601)
Following the precepts of the RMBCA, the Act does not limit
rights, preferences, and limitations that the corporation may specify for
its shares, except in the one respect discussed below, and except for
11. Id. at § 607.0624(2).
12. Id. at § 607.0601(2).
13. See id. at § 607.1004(1).
14. See id. at §§ 607.0601, .0621. The one exception to this rule is an amend-
ment to increase the corporation's authorized shares to accommodate a stock split or
stock dividend if the corporation has only one class of stock outstanding. Id. at §
607.1002(5).
15. FLA. STAT. § 607.0601 (1990). Section 607.0202 generally specifies all mat-
ters to be covered by the articles, including authorized shares while section 607.0601
concerns only authorized shares. See id. at §§ 607.0202, .0601.
16. Id. at § 607.0602.
1322 [Vol. 15
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provisions that are inconsistent with other provisions of the Act.I" Sec-
tion 607.0601 allows the corporation and its shareholders to freely
* agree on all the terms of the corporation's capital stock.' 8 These terms
include voting fights, redemption and conversion rights (at any person's
option), shareholder distributions, and relative preferences among clas-
ses with respect to distributions." The official comment calls the terms
on this list the "principal features that are customarily incorporated
into classes of shares."20 The official comment also sets forth illustra-
tive examples of "innovative" classes of shares that are permitted by
the RMBCA, including classes authorized to elect a specified number
of directors, classes entitled to vote as a separate voting group on'cer-
tain transactions, variations of voting rights among shares (including
nonvoting, fractional, and multiple votes per share), and variations
among classes in dividend rights and rights on dissolution. 21 To cover
terms that they might have missed and to encourage market innova-
tion, the drafters add for good measure in subsection four that this list
"is not exhaustive. '22 The Act specifically does not limit a corporation's
ability to differentiate among classes with respect to voting rights,
clearly authorizing nonvoting shares and shares with fractional or mul-
tiple voting rights.23 However, other regulations, such as stock ex-
change requirements, might restrict a corporation's discretion in this
respect.24
17. An example of a provision that would be inconsistent with other provisions of
the Act is the elimination of the voting protections to which all shares are entitled
pursuant to Florida Statutes section 607.1004 (1990).
18. Id. at § 607.0601.
19. Id. at § 607.0601(1), (3).
20. MBCAA, supra note 4, at 357.
21. Id. at 360.
22. Id.
23. FLA. STAT. § 607.0601 (1990). Section 607.0601(3)(a), concerning voting
rights provisions, states that the articles of incorporation may authorize shares that
"[h]ave special, conditional, or limited voting rights, or no rights, or'no right to vote,
except to the extent prohibited by this act . . . ." Id. at § 607.0601(3)(a) (emphasis
added). The emphasized language was added in error to text taken from section
6.01(c) of the RMBCA, supra note 4, and is proposed for deletion pursuant to the
Second Corrections Bill, because shares with "no rights" are worthless. Authorization
to issue shares with no voting rights is covered by the next clause, "or no right to vote."
Id.
24. See, e.g., NEw YORK STOCK EXCHANGE LISTED COMPANY MANUAL §
313.00 (1990) (generally requiring that an exchange listed issuer not have a class of
shares with voting rights not in proportion to the class equity interests).
1991] 1323
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Section 607.0601 is basically enabling rather than restrictive.25
The Act recognizes that each corporation and its shareholders face
their own unique financial and control circumstances and should be
permitted to structure the corporation's capital structure 'to accommo-
date those particular circumstances. Implicitly, the Act completes the
shift in emphasis away from restrictive and protective corporate stat-
utes to reliance on the following elements:
(a)the interest and sophistication of informed parties to the secur-
ity purchase transaction in vigorously defending their own interests;
(b)full disclosure requirements and anti-fraud rules mandated by
the state and federal securities laws, to ensure that the buyer is com-
pletely and accurately informed before it makes the purchase and that
the transaction itself is not subject to manipulation by the issuer; and
(c)fiduciary duties of directors that require them to act reasonably
and in good faith, especially in transactions in which they are inter-
ested, which involve the greatest potential for abuse.
The Act completes the deregulation of corporate law governing the
specifications of capital stock.
Practically, this new law concerning authorized shares is not revo-
lutionary, because the former law permitted most types of equity secur-
ities, either expressly or implicitly. The Act more clearly welcomes in-
novation, and permits some kinds of equity and hybrid securities which
had unclear status under the former law.2" Section 607.0601(2) im-
25. See FLA. STAT. § 607.0601 (1990) (emphasis added).
26. By implication, the former law provided broad authorization to the corpora-
tion to issue shares with a wide range of attributes. Under this former law, FLA. STAT.
§ 607.044(1) (1989) (repealed 1990) provided that "shares may be divided into one or
more classes, any or all of which may consist of shares . . . with such designations,
preferences, limitations, and relative rights as shall be stated in the articles of incorpo-
ration." Subsection two of this section listed permitted terms for "special and pre-
ferred" classes of shares, but prefaced the list by stating that it did not limit the fore-
going general authority of section 607.044(1). Id. at § 607.044(2). By implication,
section 607.044(1) granted the corporation broad plenary authority to create a wide
range of equity securities. The corporation's plenary authority under the Act is con-
firmed more clearly, however, with the "not exhaustive" provision in section
607.0601(4). See FLA. STAT. § 607.0601(4) (1990).
The former law listed specifically permitted terms for "special and preferred
shares" but left unclear whether common shares could be subject to those terms. FLA.
STAT. § 607.044(2) (1989) (repealed 1990). Whether the term "special" classes in-
cluded common shares was unclear, because that term was not defined. The former law
did not expressly address whether common shares could be redeemed by the corpora-
tion. Also, unlike the Act, the former law did not expressly permit (a) shares converti-
1324 [Vol. 15
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poses a blanket limitation that was not expressly established under the
former law.17 The corporation must authorize one or more classes of
shares that together have unlimited voting rights and one or more
shares that together have rights to the net assets of the corporation
upon dissolution. These attributes are associated with traditional com-
mon stock.
Unlike corporate law in many states, the Act does not restrict the
corporation from: (a) creating shares that are convertible at the share-
holder's option into cash (shares with a "put option"), into other classes
of shares that have preferential financial rights, or into debt securities
of a corporation (shares with "upstream" conversion privileges); or (b)
creating a class of voting shares without preferential financial rights
that is callable by the corporation (redeemable common shares) 28 The
official comment to section 6.01 of the RMBCA reasons that this
change has little practical effect because the corporation and its share-
holders generally could agree separately in a buy-sell agreement to re-
demption of the shares at either person's option.2
An upstream conversion feature eliminates the permanence associ-
ated with common shares that favors the corporation. Because the
ble into debt or debt convertible into shares, or (b) shares subject to conversion or
redemption at the option of a third person or on the occurrence of a designated event.
Finally, the blank check provision of the former law, section 607.047, limited to a list
the particular terms that could be the subject of variations between series, but its coun-
terpart in the Act, section 607.0602(1), refers back to the relatively unlimited provi-
sions of section 607.0601 of the Act.
27. FLA. STAT. § 607.0601(2) (1990).
28. RMBCA, supra note 4, at § 6.01 (official comment). The former law ex-
pressly permitted conversions of "preferred or special classes" to any other class of
shares and redemption of "preferred or special classes" at the shareholder or corpora-
tion's option, but did not expressly address redeemable or puttable common stock. See
FLA. STAT. § 607.044(2).
29. The comment states: "If it is possible to create what is essentially a callable
voting share by agreement, there is no reason why such provisions should not be built
directly and publicly into the capital structure of the corporation if that is desired."
RMBCA, supra note 4, at § 6.01 (official comment). In Florida, this statement might
understate the practical effect of the change, because nothing in the former law ex-
pressly addressed the enforceability of an agreement granting the corporation a right to
call its common stock in the absence of a proposed transfer by the shareholder. Even
section 607.0627, which was added by the Act and governs agreements restricting a
shareholder's right to transfer his shares, does not expressly state that an agreement
between the corporation and its shareholder may authorize the corporation to simply
call its common shares, even if the shareholder does not initiate a transfer. See FLA.
STAT. § 607.0627 (1990).
13251991]
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holder might cash out or convert to a relatively more senior security
when the corporation's prospects dim and the corporation most needs
cash or equity. Conversely, by agreeing to redemption at the corpora-
tion's option, the common shareholder forfeits the relatively permanent
nature of his interest in the corporation and the prospect of benefitting
to an unlimited extent from future value appreciation. Even without
redemption provisions, the shareholder might be squeezed out by a
merger, reverse stock split or similar event, but these are extraordinary
events and typically invoke dissenters' rights. The Act permits the com-
mon shareholder to agree in advance to redemption of his shares pre-
cisely when the corporation's prospects become favorable, although the
corporation's exercise of power to redeem common stock might be re-
stricted by securities laws or fiduciary duty principles.3 0
The Act permits creation of "hybrid securities" that have mixed
debt and equity attributes, for example, convertible debt (debt to eq-
uity or equity to debt) and debt that is entitled to participate in earn-
ings or dividends. 3 1 However, the official comment to section 6.01 of
the RMBCA states that only securities characterized as "shares" may
be given the right to vote.32 Therefore, a corporation could not issue a
debt security that entitles the holder to vote on a default, although a
debt security that is convertible into an equity security on default is
permitted.
The RMBCA does not generally define or use the terms "com-
mon" and "preferred" stock. The official comment explains this policy
decision:
Traditional corporation statutes work from a perceived inheritance
of concepts of "common shares" and "preferred shares" that at one
time may have had considerable meaning but that today often do
not involve significant distinctions. It is possible under modern cor-
30. See, e.g., Zahn v. Transamerica Corp., 162 F.2d 36 (3d Cir. 1947) (control-
ling shareholder breached fiduciary duty by causing directors to redeem minority
shareholders' stock following a rise in the market value of raw materials manufactured
by the corporation); Green v. Hamilton Int'l Corp., 437 F. Supp. 723 (S.D.N.Y. 1977)
(redemption constitutes "purchase" for purposes of section 10(b) of the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934 and Rule lOb-5 thereunder); Tillis v. United Parts, Inc., 395 So.
2d 618 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (majority shareholder and corporation breached
fiduciary duty to minority shareholders by purchasing majority shareholders' shares at
a premium); see generally Note, Partial and Selective Reacquisitions of Corporate
Securities, 15 CAL. W.L. REv. 264 (1979).
31. FLA. STAT. § 607.0601(3)(b) (1990).
32. RMBCA, supra note 4, at § 6.01.
[Vol. 151326
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poration statutes to create classes of "common" shares that have
important preferential rights and classes of "preferred" shares that
are subordinate in all important economic aspects or that are indis-
tinguishable from common shares in either voting rights or entitle-
ment to participate in the assets of the corporation upon dissolu-
tion. The [RMBCA] breaks away from the inherited concepts of
"common" and "preferred" shares and develops more general lan-
guage to reflect the actual flexibility in the creation of classes of
shares that exists in modern corporate practice.33
The former law did not define those terms or expressly refer to common
and preferred shares in describing share attributes, so this change is
not revolutionary in Florida. 4 In a slight variance from the RMBCA,
the Act still uses these terms in one confusing reference in section
607.0202, discussed below,35 and in the following sentence of section
607.0601(5): "Shares which are entitled to preference in the distribu-
tion of dividends or assets shall not be designated as common shares,
shares which are not entitled to preference in the distribution of divi-
dends or assets shall be common shares and shall not be designated as
preferred shares."36 This text was derived from the former law, section
607.044(4)," not from the RMBCA. Apparently, the Act's drafters
were not willing to rely on federal and state securities laws to deter
misleading characterizations of common and preferred stock.
The elimination of statutory definitions of share rights causes the
share descriptions in the articles of incorporation to assume great im-
portance. These descriptions constitute the shareholders' "contract"
with respect to their shares.3 " The official comment states that in some
limited circumstances, shares still may be described simply.3 9 A capital
structure consisting of only a single class of "common shares" may be
described as such; all voting and residual equity financial interests will
vest in that class, without further delineation. Additionally, for a capi-
tal structure consisting of two classes, one with a liquidation prefer-
ence, "it is necessary to specify only the preferential liquidation rights
33. Id.
34. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. §§ 607.097, .137 (1989) (repealed 1990) (voting and
dividends, respectively).
35. See infra note 46 and accompanying text.
36. FLA. STAT. § 607.0601(5) (1990).
37. FLA. STAT. § 607.044(4) (1989) (repealed 1990).
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of that class; in the absence of a contrary provision in the articles, the
remaining class would be entitled to receive the net assets remaining
after the liquidation preference has been satisfied. 4 ° Otherwise, all
preferences and special rights of shares should be well described, be-
cause those rights are not spelled out in the Act and exist only to the
extent specifically stated in the articles of incorporation. 41 Each class
must be given a "distinguishing designation," for example, "nonvoting
common shares" or "class A preferred shares."
In section 607.0601, the Act varies from the RMBCA by omitting
the following sentence: "All shares of a class must have preferences,
limitations, and relative rights identical with those of other shares of
the same class except to the extent otherwise permitted by section
6.02. "142 The purpose of omitting this sentence was to facilitate anti-
takeover measures that involve securities discriminating against hostile
bidders, but its omission leaves a gap. Generally, the RM BCA contem-
plates uniformity of share attributes within the class except for varia-
tions between series within the class. The omission of the sentence,
however, permits the corporation to vary the rights, preferences, and
limitations of shares within a class, even if the corporation does not use
series. The Act does provide in section 607.0602(3) that each share of
a series be identical and that it be identical with the other shares of the
class, except to the extent distinguished by the terms of the series.
However, this provision would not apply if the corporation does not
have series.
The omission of the foregoing sentence supports the conclusion
that corporations may vary share attributes within classes without us-
ing series. This raises several issues. Did the drafters of the Act con-
template that a corporation might issue numerous shares within a sin-
gle class, each share with different rights, preferences, and limitations?
Why should a corporation use series at all, if it can otherwise establish
shares with variable rights within the class? Does not the RMBCA's
scheme contemplate that variations within a class will take the form of
series? What unintended results might follow from tinkering with this
40. Id.
41. See, e.g., Judah v. Delaware Trust Co., 378 A.2d 624 (Del. 1977) (the provi-
sions of the articles of incorporation control the rights of preferred shareholders, and
those shares have only those rights granted or provided in the articles); see generally
Buxbaum, Preferred Stock-Law and Draftsmanship, 42 CAL. L. REx'. 243 (1954) (an
excellent discussion of drafting points for preparation of preferred stock provisions).
42. RMBCA, supra note 4, at § 6.01.
1328 [Vol. 15
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traditional scheme of classes with uniform share attributes? Might the
new scheme facilitate new, as yet unseen, versions of the poison pill?
For example, a corporation seemingly may provide in its articles that
any shareholder owning more than a certain number of shares auto-
matically loses the benefits of its share ownership, including voting
rights, dividends, and liquidation rights. This discrimination among the
holders of shares (not just rights or options as contemplated by section
607.0624(2)) of a single class might be considered authorized by the
Act.43
B. Blank Check Authority (Section 607.0602)
Section 607.0602 confirms that the articles of incorporation may
give "blank check" authority to the board of directors to determine the
preferences, limitations, and relative rights of any class or series of
shares before the shares are issued.44 The Act provides for extension of
blank check authority to common shares as well as preferred. The for-
mer law referred only to designations of "preferred" and "special"
shares, and left unclear whether "special" classes included common
shares.4 5 The Act also permits extension of blank check authority to
43. The drafters' commentary to section 607.0601 does not address these issues.
See FLA. STAT. § 607.0601 (1990). The commentary states, briefly and incorrectly, that
the proposed provision does not differ materially from the former law. The former law
provided for equality among the shares of a class, as follows: "[A]lI shares of the same
class shall be identical except as to the following relative rights and preferences, as to
which there may be variations between different series. . . ." FLA. STAT. § 607.047(1)
(1989) (repealed 1990). Professor Stuart Cohn, a member of the drafting committee,
told the author that the modification omitting the share equality sentence occurred
after preparation of the commentary.
Other states adopting the RMBCA have not adopted this modification. See, e.g.,
ARK. STAT. ANN. § 4-27-601A (1989); CAL. CORP. CODE § 400(b) (1989); GA. CODE
ANN. § 14-2-601(a) (1989); IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-25-1(a) (1989); Ky. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 271B.6-010(l) (1989); MIss. CODE ANN. § 79-4-6.01(a) (1972); OR. REV.
STAT. § 60.131(1) (1989); S.C. CODE § 33-6-101(a) (1976); TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-
16-101(a) (1989); VA. CODE § 13.1-638A (1950).
44. FLA. STAT. § 607.0602 (1990). Before issuing blank check shares, the corpo-
ration must deliver to the Department of State "articles of amendment" to the articles
of incorporation that set forth the terms of the class or series of shares and become part
of the corporation's articles of incorporation. Once shares of the class or series are
issued, the terms can be changed only with shareholder approval. Id. at §
607.1004(1)(d). Conversely, the terms may be changed without shareholder approval
before the shares are issued. Id. at § 607.0602(1).
45. FLA. STAT. § 607.047.
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classes. Prior law permitted authorization of the directors to establish
the terms of series only. The Act's intent on these matters is clear,
although the Act mistakenly retains vestiges of the former law in sec-
tion 607.0202(1)(d) and (e) that seem to contemplate limiting blank
check authority to series and to "preferred" and "special" shares.46
46. FLA. STAT. § 607.0202(1)(d), (e) (1990). The drafters added potentially con-
fusing language in section 607.0202(1), which provides in part:
"The articles of incorporation must set forth: . . .
(d) If the shares are to be divided into classes, the designation of each
class and the statement of the preferences, limitations, and relative rights
in respect of the shares of each class; . . . [and]
(e) If the corporation is to issue the shares of any preferred or special class
in series, the designation of each series and a statement of the variations in
the relative rights and preferences as between series insofar as the same
are to be fixed in the articles of incorporation and a statement of any au-
thority to be vested in the board of directors to establish series and fix and
determine the variations in the relative rights and preferences between se-
ries ....
Id. at § 607.0202(1) (Section 607.0202 is derived from section 2.02 of the RMBCA,
supra note 4, except for these subsections, and section 607.0202(0), concerning preemp-
tive rights, which were added by the Act.). The quoted text is confusing because it is
derived from the former law, which allowed blank check provisions for series, but not
classes. Part (d) does not clarify that in some cases terms of classes might not be
established when the articles are initially filed. This language might confuse, because it
seems to require that the articles initially spell out the terms of each class, rather than
leaving them for future determination by the board of directors. Compare section
607.0601(1) (derived from the RMBCA) which states as follows: "If more than one
class of shares is authorized, the articles of incorporation must prescribe a distinguish-
ing designation for each class, and prior to the issuance of shares of a class, the pref-
erences, limitations and relative rights of that class must be described in the articles of
incorporation. Id. at § 607.0601(1) (emphasis added). This language clarifies that only
the class designation initially must be stated in the articles and that specification of the
terms of each class can be reserved for later determination pursuant to blank check
power, to be evidenced by articles of amendment filed before issuance. Section
607.0202(1)(d) also does not refer to any requirement that the terms of series must be
described in the articles of incorporation, even though similar to classes, their terms
eventually must be described in an amendment to the articles. Id. at § 607.0202(l)(d).
Part (e) furthers this confusion by referring to the delegation to the board of au-
thority to "establish series and fix and determine the variations in the relative rights
and preferences between series." Id. at § 607.0202(1)(e). This subsection does not refer
to blank check authority for classes, again inconsistently with section 607.0602, which
grants authority to directors to establish the terms of not only series but also of classes.
Also, subsection (e) refers to blank check provisions for "preferred and special series,"
reintroducing language of the former law that left unclear whether blank check author-
ity could be extended to common shares. The Second Corrections Bill proposes deletion
of parts (d) and (e), which would eliminate the inconsistencies and make section
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This change probably will have little practical significance because
classes and series are not inherently different, and the board of direc-
tors may do little more with blank check classes than with blank check
series.47 A series is simply a subset of a class, but with the same poten-
tial attributes. An exception is the requirement in Florida that shares
of the same series be identical, but apparently not shares of the same
class.
Blank check authority historically has served two important pur-
poses: to enhance capital-raising efforts; and to facilitate adoption of
anti-takeover measures. For its capital-raising efforts, the board of di-
rectors receives- broad and instant flexibility to determine share attrib-
utes without prior shareholder approval. This flexibility facilitates
transactions that involve last-minute negotiations between the issuer
and share purchasers concerning the securities' attributes.
Blank check authority enables the issuer to quickly take advantage
of favorable changes in market variables such as stock prices, interest
rates, and currency trading rates. Typically, the class of shares is de-
scribed in the articles with key market-dependant economic terms left
open. The terms of each series within the class are determined accord-
ing to market conditions when shares of the series are issued. For ex-
ample, the market-dependant terms of a series of preferred stock might
include the dividend rate (variable or fixed-if variable, the formula
for determination), timing for payment of dividends, conversion and re-
demption rights, and special voting rights. Generally, all shares of the
series are issued concurrently, because changes in market conditions
quickly make the these market-dependant terms obsolete.
Existing shareholders might be concerned with the potential dilu-
tive effect of blank check shares on their shares. Each existing share-
holder must rely on the good business judgment of the corporation's
directors not to issue shares on more favorable terms, and then only to
suit real capital needs. In normal circumstances (no self dealing or in-
terest in the transaction), the business judgment rule will insulate di-
rectors from shareholder challenges to their actions in issuing blank
check shares. Therefore, shareholders might desire to restrict directors'
607.0202(1) basically consistent with the RMBCA, supra note 4.
47. Manning, supra note 9, at 1532. The official comment to section 6.02 of the
RMBCA states: "This section recognizes that in some contexts there is no substantive
difference between a 'class' and a 'series within a class', and that the labels are often a
matter of convenience." RMBCA, supra note 4, at § 6.02 (official comment).
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blank check authority by negotiating restrictions on that authority as
part of their purchase of shares.
III. SHARE OPTIONS (SECTION 607.0624)
Section 607.0624(1) of the Act conforms to section 6.24 of the
RMBCA, and confirms that, unless otherwise provided in its articles of
incorporation, the corporation may issue rights, options, and warrants
for the purchase of its shares.4 The directors establish the terms of
these securities and the consideration for which the underlying shares
are issued. Generally, shareholder approval is not required.4 9
Section 607.0624(2) expressly permits a corporation to impose
conditions or restrictions that deprive specified persons of the options'
benefit, including "persons owning or offering to acquire a specified
number or percentage of the outstanding common shares or other se-
curities of the corporation . . ."I' This provision carries over the pro-
visions of former law, section 607.058, 51 authorizing poison pill rights
plans that discriminate against persons acquiring or threatening to ac-
quire the corporation's shares.
IV. A SPECIAL APPLICATION-POISON PILL PLANS
In recent years, statutes similar to section 607.0602 (blank check
authorization) and section 607.0624 (share options) have been used by
corporations to implement "poison pill" or "shareholder rights" plans
without prior shareholder approval, to the dismay of many institutional
investors.52 The Act includes provisions that are designed to facilitate
these plans and to avoid challenges based on grounds that have been
48. FLA. STAT. § 607.0624(l) (1990).
49. Shareholder approval may be obtained as a discretionary matter, to comply
with listing requirements, see NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE LISTED COMPANY MAN-
UAL § 309.00 (1990), or to obtain the benefits of federal law conditioned on share-
holder approval, see S.E.C. Rule 16b-3(a).
50. FLA. STAT. § 607.0624(2) (1990).
51. FLA. STAT. § 607.058 (1989) (repealed 1990).
52. See, e.g., "K-mart Won't Oppose Holder's Bid for Vote on Foison-Pill Plan,"
Wall Street J., Dec. 7, 1990, at A4 ("The Wisconsin board ...has campaigned for
years against what it sees as the improperly unilateral means by which poison-pill mea-
sures are put in place by a simple vote of the board. Implementing other anti-takeover
defenses, such as staggered terms for directors, typically requires Drior holder ap-
proval."). Institutional holders have proposed that the federal proxy rales be amended
to require a shareholder vote for adoption of poison pills.
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successful in other states.
"Poison pill" or "shareholder rights" plans come in many forms,
but generally involve distribution by the corporation of rights or securi-
ties that have redemption or conversion provisions. Once triggered by a
hostile takeover attempt or a party acquiring a specified percentage of
a class of the issuer's securities, the plans make the securities exces-
sively or prohibitively expensive to buy.53 The principal poison pill pro-
visions are as follows: (a) a "flip-in provision" that grants each share-
holder (other than the bidder) an option to purchase the issuer's
securities at a substantial discount on the occurrence of the triggering
event (usually acquisition or tender for a certain amount of shares,
such as 20 %); (b) a "flip-over provision" that permits each shareholder
to purchase the acquiring corporation's securities at a discount follow-
ing a merger or consolidation; and (c) a "back-end" provision that per-
mits each shareholder (other than the bidder) to exchange its shares
for a package of the issuer's securities following completion of a hostile
takeover.54
Reduced to their simplest forms, the flip-in provision grants a
shareholder an option to purchase the issuer's shares at a discount, a
flip-over provision grants a shareholder an option to purchase the ac-
quiror's shares at a discount in a manner similar to anti-dilution provi-
sions, and a back-end provision grants the shareholder the right to
force redemption of his shares on favorable terms. Many plans include
combinations of these provisions. The key element of the flip-in and
back-end plans is discrimination against the person making the acquisi-
tion or takeover attempt. That person is denied the opportunity to exer-
cise option or redemption rights on the same favorable, often financially
ruinous to the issuer, terms as other security holders. The practical ef-
fect of the poison pill plan is to preclude a hostile tender offer until the
plan is canceled by the directors or declared void by a court. Its osten-
sible purpose is to give directors leverage to negotiate a favorable
purchase price with a hostile bidder.55
53. See generally C. SIMON & Co., CORPORATE ANTI-TAKEOVER DEFENSES: THE
POISON PILL DEVICE (1989); Note, Delaware's Attempt to Swallow a New Takeover
Defense: The Poison Pill Preferred Stock, 10 DEL. J. CORP. L. 569 (1985).
54. For an example of a flip-over plan, see Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 500
A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985).
55. This article does not address the thorny question of whether poison pill plans
really benefit shareholders. Compare City Capital Assoc. Ltd. Partnership v. Interco,
Inc., [1988-89] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,084 (Del. Ch. 1988) stating:
Even where an offer is noncoercive, it may represent a 'threat' to share-
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Most poison pill litigation concerns the directors' proper exercise
of their fiduciary duties in adopting and implementing poison pill
plans. 56 Underlying this issue, however, is the question whether direc-
tors have corporate authority to issue the securities that constitute the
poison pill. In Delaware, this issue has been settled in favor of direc-
tors.57 The drafters of the Act evidently were concerned with contrary
decisions of courts in other states. For example, in Amalgamated
Sugar Co. v. NL Industries, a federal district court applying New
Jersey law held that a flip-in provision was ultra vires and void because
it "effects a discrimination among shareholders of the same class or
holder interests in the special sense that an active negotiator with power
[conveyed by a poison pill], in effect, to refuse the proposal may be able to
extract a higher or otherwise more valuable proposal, or may be able to
arrange an alternative transaction or a modified business plan that will
present a more valuable option to shareholders.
with Dynamics Corp. v. CTS Corp., 794 F.2d 250, 255 (7th Cir. 1986) (Posner, J.)
("Personally we are rather skeptical about the arguments for defensive measures ....
We are especially skeptical about the arguments used to defend poison pills.").
56. See, e.g., Interco, Inc., [1988-89] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. at 94,034; CRTF Corp.
v. Federated Dep't Stores, 683 F. Supp. 422 (S.D.N.Y. 1988); In re J.P. Stevens &
Co., 542 A.2d 770 (Del. Ch. 1988).
57. In Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985), the Delaware
Supreme Court rejected a challenge to a plan based on allegations that the directors
lacked authority to implement the plan under the Delaware General Corporation Law.
The court accepted the directors' position that they had the requisite authority under
section 157 and section 151 of the Delaware General Corporation Law, which are
roughly the same as Florida Statutes section 607.0624(1) (1990) (share options) and
section 607.0602 (1990) (blank check authority). Moran, 500 A.2d at 1346. The court
rejected the plaintiffs' argument that those provisions were not intended to be the basis
of anti-takeover measures, but rather were limited to corporate financing and other
conventional uses. Id. at 1352.
In Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 180 (Del.
1986), the Delaware court upheld the directors' authority to implement a back-end
poison pill that discriminated against the bidder. The court reached this conclusion
even though Delaware did not have a counterpart to section 607.0624(2) of the Act,
which authorizes discrimination among shareholders with respect to the exercise rights
of options. Courts construing Delaware law also have upheld the authority of directors
to implement flip-in provisions that discriminate against the bidder, based on Moran.
See, e.g., BNS, Inc. v. Koppers Co., 683 F. Supp. 458, 474 (D. Del. 1988) (the plain-
tiffs conceded that the board was authorized to implement the plan); see also Dynam-
ics Corp. v. CTS Corp., 637 F. Supp. 406 (N.D. Ill.), aft'd, 794 F.2d 250 (7th Cir.
1986) (Indiana law); but see Unilever Acquisition v. Richardson-Vicks Inc., 618 F.
Supp. 407 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (federal court construing Delaware law before Moran, 500
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series."58 Under the plan, the voting rights and equity of the acquiring
shareholder are diluted upon the triggering event.59 The court invali-
dated the flip-in poison pill despite the existence of blank check and
share option provisions under New Jersey law comparable to sections
151 and 157 of the Delaware Code, which were the basis for validating
poison pills in that state.60
Florida courts have not addressed the authority of a board of di-
rectors to establish a poison pill or shareholder rights plan. To preclude
future judicial invalidity, the Act addresses these potential challenges
to a poison pill plan. Section 607.0624(2) expressly permits issuance of
options or rights that discriminate against persons acquiring or offering
to acquire more than a certain percentage of shares, validating flip-in
plans that involve the issuance of rights. Further, section 607.0601
omits the sentence from section 6.01 of the RMBCA providing that all
shares of a class must have identical preferences, limitations, and rela-
tive rights."' This omission sanctions discrimination among sharehold-
ers within a class with respect to share terms, such as plans involving
preferred stock with a discriminatory conversion or redemption right.
For example, the corporation might distribute to its shareholders a divi-
dend consisting of preferred shares convertible, by all shareholders ex-
cept the bidder into common shares on favorable terms, based on the
occurrence of a triggering stock event.62 The Act allows discriminatory
limitations denying the conversion right to persons holding more than a
certain number of shares, which otherwise might run afoul of share
equality precepts.
58. 644 F. Supp. 1224, 1234 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
59. Id. at 1299. The court reasoned that the plan in substance constituted a re-
structuring of voting and equity rights within the class, which could not be effected
without a shareholder vote. Id. at 1234-35. The court also found that the plan had a
preclusive effect on prospective tender offers. Id. at 1239.
60. Id. at 1234-35; see also Minstar Acquiring Corp. v. AMF Inc., 621 F. Supp.
1252 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (rights plan that discriminated between shareholders based on
date of share acquisition held void under New Jersey law); Asarco Inc. v. M.R.H.
Holmes A Court, 611 F. Supp. 468 (D.N.J. 1985).
61. FLA. STAT. § 607.0601 (1990).
62. This type of security, commonly known as "poison pill preferred stock," is
discussed at length in Comment, Protecting Shareholders Against Partial and Two-
Tiered Takeovers: The "Poison Pill" Preferred, 97 HARV. L. REv. 1964 (1984).
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V. FUNDAMENTAL CHANGES TO THE FLORIDA CORPORATION'S
CAPITAL STRUCTURE
The Act generally eliminates par value, stated capita], capital sur-
plus, and treasury shares. Par value was an arbitrary amount assigned
to each share (e.g., $1.00 per share), below which the corporation was
prohibited from selling its shares.63 Stated capital was generally the
sum of the par value of all outstanding shares with par value and the
amount assigned by directors to stated capital with respect to no-par
shares.64
Par value and stated capital were eliminated for well-recognized
reasons. Generally, they added complexity without any offsetting bene-
fit.6 5 Par value was an arbitrary dollar amount. The former law did not
require directors to establish a par value having any particular relation
to the shares' actual market value, and par value did not fluctuate with
changes in share market value. For this reason, par value misled inves-
tors who equated par value and actual share market value or net asset
value. Further, the sole restrictive effect of par value-to place a floor
on the purchase price of shares-was rendered meaningless by wide-
spread use of nominal par value amounts (e.g., $.01 per share) that
were far below the shares' actual value.66 Par value did nothing to stop
the corporation from selling at a price less than fair value.
Further, the amount of stated capital bore no relationship to the
63. FLA. STAT. § 607.054 (1989) (repealed 1990).
64. FLA. STAT. §§ 607.004(15), .061 (1990). This article does not discuss in de-
tail the provisions of prior law concerning par value, no-par shares, stated capital, and
related concepts, because the Act repealed them. For a detailed explanation of these
provisions and their history, purpose, and operation, see B. MANNING & J. HANKS.
LEGAL CAPITAL (3d ed. 1990).
65. See RMBCA, supra note 4, at § 6.21 (official comment and historical back-
ground). Par value and stated capital have been cannon fodder for scholars for many
years. See, e.g., B. MANNING & J. HANKS, supra note 64, at 91-97 ("The legal capital
schemes embedded in the nation's state corporation acts are inherently doomed to a low
level of effectiveness (perhaps even zero)."); Cohn, Capital Structure. Dividends and
Redemption-Time for a Change to Florida's Corporate Code, 56 FLA.. B.J. 574 (June
1982) (the Act grants Professor Cohn his fervent wish for change); Hackney, The Fi-
nancial Provisions of the Model Business Corporation Act, 70 HARV. L. REV. 1357
(1957) (describing the difficulties of accurately calculating surplus); Note, The Inade-
quacy of Stated Capital Requirements, 40 CINN. L. REV. 823 (1971).
66. As discussed below, Florida's documentary stamp tax on the par value of
shares virtually compels the Florida corporation to set a very low par value such as
$0.01 per share, because it is assessed on the shares' par value rather than their market
value. See FLA. STAT. § 201.05(1) (1990).
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actual amount of capital necessary for the corporation's business opera-
tions. Stated capital did not protect creditors by providing an "equity
cushion," because nothing required that the amount be sufficient to
provide a cushion against operating losses and because the amount
could be changed at the shareholders' option, after credit had been ex-
tended. 67 Creditors today rely on other mechanisms for credit protec-
tion, such as financial covenants in their loan documents, close monitor-
ing of the corporation's financial condition, and legal restrictions
(retained by the Act) that limit transfers and distributions if the corpo-
ration is insolvent. 68
Par value and the related concepts of stated capital, capital sur-
plus, and other similar provisions added great complexity to the corpo-
ration's capital structure. For example, a stock split required an
amendment to the articles of incorporation to change the corporation's
par value. The par value and stated capital concepts required three dif-
ferent definitions of surplus-surplus, earned surplus, and capital sur-
plus.69 Consider the following language of the former law that governed
the conversion of a share without par value into a share with par value:
[S]hares without par value shall not be converted into shares with
par value unless that part of the stated capital of the corporation
represented by such shares without par value is, at the time of con-
version, at least equal to the aggregate par value of the shares into
which the shares without par value are to be converted, or the
amount of any such deficiency is transferred from surplus to stated
capital.70
The official comment to the Act in the RMBCA clarifies that fol-
lowing this change, a corporation need not differentiate on its balance
sheet between stated capital and surplus accounts, even if it elects to
67. For example, a corporation with the common par value of $.01 per share and
1,000,000 outstanding shares would have stated capital of only $10,000, which is insuf-
ficient for a corporation with operations of any substance.
68. FLA. STAT. § 607.06401 (1990). With respect to fraudulent transfers, see,
e.g., FLA. STAT. § 726.101 (1988) (the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act); 11 U.S.C.
99 546, 548 (1986) (United States Bankruptcy Code).
69. FLA. STAT. §§ 607.004(4), (6), (17) (1989) (repealed 1990). A treatise is
devoted to explaining these subjects. See B. MANNING & J. HANKS, supra note 64.
Significantly, in the 1990 edition, the authors required 176 pages to explain the "laby-
rinth" of legal capital doctrine and critique its failures, but only 15 pages to explain its
repeal and the current provisions of the RMBCA, supra note 4.
70. FLA. STAT. § 607.044.
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retain par value." The corporation may use a single simple entry,
"paid-in capital," to reflect the amounts received for its shares.7 2 A
corporation may retain the historic classifications of stated capital and
capital surplus if it so desires.73
Corporations still should consider using a nominal par value (such
as $.01 per share) even though it lacks any legal significance under the
Act, because of the Florida documentary stamp tax on shares. This tax
is assessed on the shares' par value or, if the share is without par value,
on its actual market value.74 Accordingly, the use of nominal par value
will avoid taxation based on the shares' market value. The Second Cor-
rections Bill would amend the documentary stamp tax law to provide
that each share without par value will be taxed based on a par value of
$.01 per share. Enactment of this amendment to the documentary
stamp tax law should eliminate the last reason for a Florida corpora-
tion to use par value.
VI. THE CORPORATION'S ISSUANCE OF SHARES (SECTIONS
607.0603 AND 607.0621)
According to section 607.0603(3), a corporation must have at all
times one or more outstanding classes of shares that together have the
attributes associated with common shares-unlimited voting rights and
entitlement to receive the net assets of the corporation on dissolution. 5
This provision is the counterpart to section 607.0601(2), which requires
that the corporation authorize shares with these attributes.7 6 Generally,
following the elimination of par value, except for fiduciary duty stan-
dards, 77 the only limitations imposed by the Act on a corporation's issu-
ance of shares and the make-up of its capital are that the shares be
authorized, that the directors determine that the consideration to be
received for the shares is adequate, that the consideration established
71. RMBCA, supra note 4, at § 6.21 (official comment).
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. FLA. STAT. § 201.05(1) (1990). The tax is 32 cents per $100 of value.
75. Id. at § 607.0603(3). Section 607.0603 was adopted verbatim from section
6.03 of the RMBCA, supra note 4. In other words, some person must own the residual
interests of the corporation.
76. FLA. STAT. § 607.0601(2).
77. The fiduciary standards governing directors' actions are set forth in section
607.0830. Id. at § 607.0830.
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for the shares be paid, and that one or more classes of outstanding
shares together have the traditional attributes of common stock de-
scribed above.
Section 607.0621 sets forth the terms on which a corporation may
sell its shares.78 Shareholders must rely on the directors' honest and
fair judgment to determine (a) the number Of shares to be issued and
the amount of capital to be raised from time to time, (b) an appropri-
ate price for any additional shares that are issued, and (c) the ade-
quacy of consideration, if non-cash consideration is received. By so pro-
viding in the articles of incorporation, shaTeholders may reserve these
rights to themselves7 9 or, more practically, limit the board's discretion
with respect to these matters. Again, the Act leaves the capital struc-
ture to the dynamics of negotiation among the corporation, its share-
holders, and its creditors, rather than mandating restrictions or limita-
tions on that structure.
A corporation may issue shares in exchange for "any tangible or
intangible property or benefit to the corporation." 80 The official com-
ment to section 6.21 of the RMBCA clarifies that "[tihe term 'benefit'
should be broadly construed to include, for example, a reduction of a
liability, a release of a claim, or benefits obtained by a corporation by
contribution of its shares to a charitable organization or as a prize in a
promotion." '81 Significantly, the Act departs from the former law by
expressly permitting shares to be issued in consideration of a promis-
sory note and future services, if evidenced by a written contract. 82 The
requirement that the contract be written departs from the RMBCA.
Although both of these forms of consideration involve future perform-
ance, the Act treats the shares as "paid" when the commitment is
given, rather than when it is fulfilled (the note is paid or the services
78. Id. at § 607.0621. A separate section, section 607.0623, covers share divi-
dends. Id. at § 607.0623.
79. Id. at § 607.0621(1).
80. Id. at § 607.0621(2).
81. RMBCA, supra note 4, at § 6.21 (official comment).
82. FLA. STAT. § 607.0621(2) (1990). Former section 607.054(6) stated: "Future
services shall not constitute payment or part payment for the issuance of shares of a
corporation." FLA. STAT. § 607.054(6) (1989) (repealed 1990); see also Lewis v.
Compton, 416 So. 2d 1219 (Fla. 1982). Although not authorized by the statute, a
promissory note was acceptable consideration under the former law. Lundquist v. Gulf-
shore Television Corp., 328 So. 2d 202 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1976). The commentary
to section 607.0621 states that the former law was unclear on this point.
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rendered) ."
The official comment to section 6.21 of the RMBCA, on which
section 607.0621 is based, notes the real concerns of the former law:
The issuance of some shares for cash and other shares for promis-
sory notes, contracts for past or future services, or for tangible or
intangible property or benefits, like the issuance of shares for an
inadequate consideration, opens the possibility of dilution of the in-
terests of other shareholders. For example, persons acquiring shares
for cash may be unfairly treated if optimistic values are placed on
past or future services or intangible benefits being provided by
other persons. The problem is particularly acute if the persons pro-
viding services, promissory notes or benefits of debatable value are
themselves connected with the promoters of the corporation or with
its directors.8 4
The RMBCA allows these forms of consideration anyway because:
commitments for future performance or payment often have substantial
present value; 5 consistently with other provisions, the RMBCA's draft-
ers were prepared to rely on the standards governing directors' actions
that are intended to protect against abuses; and the practical problems
associated with these forms of consideration can be resolved through
skillful structuring of the share sale transaction."6 Once again, the
RMBCA eliminates an "artificial" or "arbitrary" rule in favor of rely-
ing on the directors' business judgment. The official comment might
have added that the practice of offering incentive stock to employees as
consideration for future services is widespread and generally recognized
as effective in aligning employees' interests with shareholders' interests.
The Act requires that a corporation issuing shares for future services
inform its shareholders of the issuance before the corporation's next
83. Compare FLA. STAT. § 607.0621(4) with RMBCA, supra note 4, at § 6.21.
84. RMBCA, supra note 4, at § 6.21 (official comment).
85. One author hypothesizes a contract with Barbara Streisand, Doug Flutie, or
a promissory note of Morgan Guaranty. Manning, supra note 9, at 1533. Of course,
that article was written before Flutie retired from football and before the financial
institution crisis.
86. The comment to the Act adds another reason-easy avoidance of the prohibi-
tion: "[T]he express prohibition in [section] 607.054(6) (1989) against future services
as consideration is easily avoided by an advance bonus (immediately repaid to the cor-
poration for the shares), the issuance of a separate class of low or no-par value stock,
forgivable loans, or other means limited only by the ingenuity of the parties." RMBCA.
supra note 4, at § 6.21 (official comment).
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Because the shares will be fully paid when issued, the corporation
should assure that the shares do not freely vest before the note is paid
or services rendered, to protect against a purchaser default. Section
607.0621(5) provides a mechanism to assure receipt of consideration
for the shares through escrow or restriction methods. 88 The shares are
issued to the shareholder in escrow or subject to restriction, but if the
relevant payments or services are not received, the shares may be can-
celed. The Act leaves unclear whether an escrow arrangement must be
with an independent third party. The Act seems to expressly permit an
arrangement in which all escrowed or restricted shares are canceled
without any compensation, even though the shareholder partially pays
or performs before reneging: "[I]f the services are not performed, the
shares escrowed or restricted and the distributions credited may be
canceled in whole or part."'89 Nothing in the former law expressly pro-
vided for a corporation to cancel shares if future payments or services
due for them were not received. Indeed, the shares could not be issued
at all without up-front payment of all consideration.9 °
The Act subtly changes the former law with respect to the direc-
tors' determinations regarding value and adequacy of consideration,
which are important to legal opinions regarding the status of shares as
fully paid and nonassessable. The Act provides for directors to use their
business judgment to establish adequate consideration for shares, with-
out any floor or other limitation. That adequacy determination is con-
clusive for purposes of the determination whether shares are fully paid
and nonassessable. The former law also provided that the directors
must value non-cash consideration received and provided that this de-
87. FLA. STAT. § 607.1621(2) (1990). Presumably, shareholders then may chal-
lenge the issuance as a breach of the directors' standard of care, if the transaction was
abusive.
88. Id. at § 607.0621(5).
89. Id. These escrow or restriction arrangements should be part of the subscrip-
tion agreement or other document evidencing the purchase terms. That agreement
should clearly provide the extent to which consideration received thus far is refundable
on cancellation. Of course, the corporation must carefully note the restriction on the
certificate or take care that possession of escrowed shares does not pass to the share-
holders to avoid transfer to bona fide purchasers free of the restriction. See id. at §
607.0627 (regarding restrictions on transfer); § 607.0622 (regarding the respective lia-
bilities of the transferee and transferor of shares for which full consideration lhas not
been paid (the transferee is not liable if a bona fide purchaser).
90. FLA. STAT. § 607.054(5) ("Shares may not be issued until the full amount of
the consideration therefore has been paid.").
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termination regarding valuation of consideration was "conclusive" in
the absence of fraud.9' However, the Act does not require this value
determination at all.92 The directors' adequacy determination need not
be set forth in a resolution-that conclusion may be inferred from the
decision to issue shares for the designated consideration. Following
the Act's elimination of par value and definitive resolution against ap-
plying any hindsight evaluation to the directors' business judgment in
establishing appropriate consideration, the lawyer may opine that
shares of a Florida corporation are fully paid and nonassessable by con-
firming that the consideration for the shares established by the board
was actually paid.9 4 The Act makes the adequacy determination con-
clusive, eliminating the possibility of hindsight judicial review of that
matter.
The conclusive presumption concerning the adequacy of considera-
tion received for shares does not extend to challenges based on self-
dealing and other fiduciary duty grounds or fraud of the person receiv-
ing the shares. 95 However, directors are entitled to the presumption of-
fered by the business judgment rule with respect to decisions to offer
shares in transactions in which they are not interested.96
Consistently with the former law, section 607.0622 confirms that a
shareholder who pays the consideration due for purchased shares gen-
erally has no further liability to the corporation, its creditors, and other
91. Id. at § 607.054(7). In some early cases, at creditors' request, courts objec-
tively appraised the value of consideration paid to determine whether the consideration
was worth the value attributed to it by the corporation and adequate given the par
value of the shares. Shareholders might be found liable for any deficiency. See, e.g.,
See v. Heppenheimer, 69 N.J. Eq. 36, 61 A. 843 (1905); Van Cleve v. Berkey, 143 Mo.
109, 44 S.W. 743 (1898); see generally RMBCA, supra note 4, at § 6.21 (historical
background). This "true value" rule was reversed by the former law which presumed
the directors' judgment of value to be correct. FLA. STAT. § 607.054(7).
92. See RMBCA. supra note 4, at § 6.21 (official comment) ("Of course, a spe-
cific value must be placed on the consideration received for the shares for bookkeeping
purposes, but bookkeeping details are not the statutory responsibility of the board of
directors.").
93. Id.
94. FLA. STAT. § 607.0621(3), (4) ("When the corporation receives the consider-
ation for which the board of directors authorized the issuance of shares, the shares
issued therefor are fully paid and nonassessable.").
95. See, e.g., Biltmore Motor Corp. v. Roque, 291 So. 2d 114, 115-16 (Fla. 3d
Dist. Ct. App. 1974) (ordering directors to revoke and rescind recapitalization plan
that involved sale of new stock at considerably less than market value because the
transaction lacked any business purpose and violated the directors' fiduciary duties).
96. FLA. STAT. § 607.0831(1) (1990).
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shareholders with respect to those shares.9 7 With the elimination of the
legal significance of par value, shareholders are no longer subject to
alleged liability for the difference between the par value and the con-
sideration that they actually paid for their shares, or "watered stock
liability." This is true even if the corporation elects to retain par value,
because the statutory connection between par value and the amount
due for shares is eliminated.
In a departure from the RMBCA, Florida rejected the RMBCA's
section 6.22, and instead adopted verbatim, as section 607.0622, the
provisions of the former law, section 607.074, except for the addition of
a five-year limitation period on actions to collect consideration due for
shares.9" Section 607.0622(1) retains provisions spelling out who may
sue a shareholder who fails to pay full consideration (the corporation,
another shareholder, and creditors). Section 607.0622(2), (3), and (4)
clarify transferor, transferee, pledgor, and pledgee liability for consid-
eration due for unpaid shares (transferor and pledgor liable; pledgee
not liable; transferee not liable if bona fide purchaser of the shares).
Presumably, despite the broad statutory language of section
607.0622(1)," 9 the shareholder remains potentially liable for the corpo-
ration's actions pursuant to equitable theories such as piercing the cor-
porate veil, even though the Act in section 607.0622 rejects, as to open
ended, the language of section 6.22(b) of the RMBCA confirming the
validity of such actions.100 In cases decided before the Act, Florida
courts have upheld actions based on veil-piercing theories notwithstand-
ing this statutory language.' 0' These decisions were probably based on
reasoning that the action is not "with respect to the . . . shares," but
rather based on the shareholder's conduct.10
2
97. Id. at § 607.0622(a).
98. Id. at § 607.0622(5). The limitations period is measured from the earlier of
the date of stock issuance or the date of the subscription on which the assessment is
sought.
99. Id. at § 607.0622(1) ("A holder of. . . shares. . . shall be under no obliga-
tion to . . . creditors with respect to such shares . . . other than to pay the full
consideration.").
100. RMBCA, supra note 4, at § 6.22(b) provides as follows: "Unless otherwise
provided in the articles of incorporation, a shareholder of a corporation is not person-
ally liable for the acts or debts of the corporation except that he may become person-
ally liable by reason of his own acts or conduct."
101. See, e.g., Vantage View v. Bali East Dev. Corp., 421 So. 2d' 728, 235 (Fla.
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VII. SHARE DIVIDENDS (SECTION 607.0623)
Share dividends are governed by section 607.0623, which adopts
the text of section 6.23 of the RMBCA. 10 3 The Act simplifies the law
governing share dividends and stock splits: all distributions of the cor-
poration's shares are treated as share dividends; share dividends are not
subject to restrictions on ordinary dividends and share repurchases; and
with the elimination of par value, stated capital, and capital surplus, no
reallocations among various capital accounts need follow a share divi-
dend and no adjustments to par value amounts need follow a stock
split.104
The principal distinction between a stock split and a share divi-
dend under the former law was that a share dividend involved a book
transfer from capital surplus to stated capital, and a stock split re-
quired a change to the corporation's par value per share.10 5 A share
dividend was treated similarly to a cash dividend, and subject to the
restriction that the corporation have adequate surplus to cover the ag-
gregate par value of distributed shares.106 The current modifications
recognize that share dividends differ fundamentally from cash divi-
dends and the transactions characterized as "distributions" under the
Act. A share dividend is a paper transaction without economic effect on
the corporation, its shareholders, or its creditors.101 Nothing happens to
the corporation's assets and the shareholders' interests in the corpora-
tion remain the same, only evidenced by more shares.'0 8
The Act does recognize the dilutive impact on a class or series of
shares when shares of its class or series are distributed as a share divi-
dend to shareholders of another class or series. 109 The Act permits
those transactions only if the articles of incorporation authorize them, a
majority of the relevant class or series approves the transaction, or no
shares of the relevant class or series are outstanding."10
103. See FLA. STAT. § 607.01401(8) (1990) (expressly excluding share dividends
from the definition of "distributions" to shareholders).
104. Id. at § 607.0623.
105. FLA. STAT. § 607.137(4), (6) (1989) (repealed 1990).
106. Id. at § 607.137(4).
107. RMBCA, supra note 4, at § 6.23 (official comment).
108. Id.
109. FLA. STAT. § 607.0623 (1990).
110. Id. at § 607.0623(2).
1344 [Vol. 15
26
Nova Law Review, Vol. 15, Iss. 3 [1991], Art. 13
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol15/iss3/13
Felman
VIII. THE CORPORATION'S DISTRIBUTIONS TO ITS
SHAREHOLDERS (SECTION 607.06401)
Many commentators call the distribution provisions the most sig-
nificant of the extensive amendments to the Model Act's financial pro-
visions that were effected in the 1980s. 111 In a significant departure
from the former law, the Act adopts a uniform definition for distribu-
tions and modifies the restrictions on distributions so that they do not
consider the corporation's relative amounts of surplus and stated capi-
tal following the distribution." 2
Instead of a single definition and standard for distributions, the
former law provided different standards for redemptions, consensual re-
purchases, and ordinary dividends." 3 Redemptions were subject only to
the limitation that they not render the corporation insolvent in the eq-
uity sense (unable to pay its debts as they became due in the ordinary
course of business)."' Dividends and consensual repurchases were sub-
ject to this equity insolvency limitation and also to the limitation that
they could be made only from unreserved and unrestricted surplus (the
portion of the corporation's capital other than stated capital)." 5 Gener-
ally, the Act modifies this surplus-based limitation (assets must equal
the sum of liabilities, stated capital, and reserved or restricted surplus)
to a net worth limitation (assets must equal liabilities plus liquidation
preferences), because the surplus-based limitation was complex and in-
effective in protecting creditors." 6 The Act applies this net worth limi-
tation and the equity insolvency limitation to all shareholder "distribu-
tions," including dividends, redemptions, and consensual
111. See, e.g., Manning, supra note 9, at 1534 ("Section 6.40 is the centerpiece
that controls asset distributions to shareholders."); Murphy, supra note 8, at 82 ("[Sec-
tion 6.40] is probably the capstone of the financial provisions in the Revised Statute.").
112. FLA. STAT. § 607.06401. This discussion focuses on the tests adopted for
distributions. Full treatment of the subject should consider fraudulent transfer law and
the fiduciary duties of directors. See id. at §§ 607.0834, .0830 (each of which is dis-
cussed cursorily here).
113. For a thorough explanation of the scheme governing distributions under the
former law, see B. MANNING & J. HANKS, supra note 64, at 63-90.
114. FLA. STAT. §§ 607.004(9), .017(3)(d) (1989) (repealed 1990).
115. Id. at §§ 607.017(1), .137; see also Baxter v. Lancer Indus., Inc., 213 F.
Supp. 92, 96 (E.D.N.Y. 1963); Coast Cities Coaches, Inc. v. Whyte, 102 So. 2d 848
(Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1958) ("Obviously, corporate funds other than those lawfully
allocable to dividends could not be used to pay for the purchase of the stock from
Whyte and Hickling.").
116. RMBCA, supra note 4, at § 6.40 (official comment).
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repurchases.117
The purpose of the law governing distributions is to protect the
relative priority status of creditors and senior equity holders. Share-
holders are subordinate to these persons with respect to their claim to
the corporation's assets in liquidation." 8 Assets are supposed to be
available to fund the payment of liabilities and liquidation preferences,
if necessary. As stated by one commentator:
If the hierarchical relationship of creditor to shareholder is to have
any meaning at all, then the management must not be left free to
shovel all the assets in the corporate treasury out to the sharehold-
ers when the corporation has insufficient assets to pay its creditors
or when the shareholder distribution itself renders the corporation
unable to pay its creditors. The central point is to avoid
insolvency. 119
The Act is carefully structured to achieve this purpose, but no more.
The Act abandons the concept of mandating an asset cushion over and
above the amount of liabilities to be available if assets prove insufficient
to pay them.
The principal significance of these provisions governing distribu-
tions is the directors' potential liability "to the corporation" for distri-
butions made improperly pursuant to section 607.0834 of the Act. Gen-
erally, a director is potentially liable for an improper distribution only
if he voted for or assented to the action and the director need only
comply with the usual standard of conduct for his actions, which is
described in section 607.0830.120 The director has available all defenses
typically associated with his actions, including the common law busi-
ness judgment rule.' 2 ' The statute and case law leave unclear whether
and how this liability "to the corporation" may be enforced by credi-
tors, directly or derivatively by shareholders, or by a bankruptcy trus-
tee succeeding to the corporation's rights.' 22
This new standard governing distributions varies from the stan-
117. FLA. STAT. § 607.06401 (1990).
118. Id.
119. B. MANNING & J. HANKS, supra note 64, at 63.
120. FLA. STAT. § 607.0830 (1990).
121. Id. at § 607.0834; RMBCA, supra note 4, at § 8.33 (official comment).
122. See B. MANNING & J. HANKS, supra note 64, at 88-90 (noting "the almost
complete absence of cases imposing liability on directors or shareholders").
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dards governing fraudulent transfers in Florida. 23 For example, one of
the standards for a fraudulent transfer focuses on the intent of the
transferor,1 24 which is irrelevant under section 607.0834.125 The official
comment to section 6.40 of the RMBCA acknowledges the difference
and justifies it based on the different purposes for which the various
statutes are intended . 26 The fraudulent transfer statute is designed to
permit the trustee to recover for the benefit of creditors transfers made
to others (such as shareholders), but section 6.40 was intended to deter-
mine the potential liability of directors to the corporation for improper
distributions. x27 The laws governing fraudulent transfers apply to the
corporation's distributions to its shareholders and must be reviewed by
the corporation planning an unusual distribution.
The Act conveniently defines "distribution" to include any transfer
of money or other property or incurrence of indebtedness by the corpo-
ration to or for the benefit of its shares. 128 Only the corporation's distri-
butions of its own shares (stock dividends) are excluded and treated in
a separate section, because those transfers do not cause any real change
in the corporation's capital structure from the creditors' standpoint. 129
For this reason, a conversion of an outstanding security into an equity
security typically would not be considered a distribution, because the
issued security constitutes a share of the corporation. Examples of dis-
tributions include cash dividends, special dividends of property (includ-
ing stock of other companies or subsidiaries), liquidating distributions,
repurchases and redemptions of the corporation's shares, and distribu-
tions of indebtedness. 3
The Act relies on a deceptively simple two-pronged test to deter-
mine whether a distribution is permitted:
No distribution may be made if, after giving it effect: (a) The cor-
poration would not be able to pay its debts as they become due in
the usual course of business; or (b) the corporation's total assets
would be less than the sum of its total liabilities plus (unless the
123. See FLA. STAT. §§ 726.101-.201 (1989).
124. Id. at § 726.105(1)(a), (2); see also 11 'U.S.C. § 548 (1986) (concerning
fraudulent transfers under the Bankruptcy Code).
125. FLA. STAT. § 607.0834 (1990).
126. RMBCA, supra note 4, at § 6.40 (official comment).
127. Id.
128. FLA. STAT. § 607.01401(8) (1990).
129. Id. at § 607.0623.
130. RMBCA, supra note 4, at § 6.40 (official comment).
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articles of incorporation permit otherwise) the amount that would
be needed, if the corporation were to be dissolved at the time of the
distribution, to satisfy the preferential rights upon dissolution of
shareholders whose preferential rights are superior to those receiv-
ing the distribution. 13 1
The first prong of the test carries over from the former law the "equity
insolvency" test. The second prong adopts what is commonly referred
to as a "balance sheet" or "net worth" insolvency test.
The equity insolvency test requires that following the distribution,
the corporation must be able to pay its debts as they become due in the
usual course of business.3 2 Older versions of the comment to section
6.40 of the RMBCA stated that the equity insolvency test was the
"4most important and fundamental test for the permissibility of distri-
butions."'13 3 This prong of the test is unfortunately subjective and if not
applied carefully, might subject the director to hindsight judicial re-
evaluation of his actions if the corporation soon fails. The official com-
ment to section 6.40 of the RMBCA provides some comfort and clarifi-
cation.13 1 It states that the existence of significant shareholder equity
and continuation of normal operations typically will be sufficient to es-
tablish that the equity insolvency test is satisfied.' 3 5 The absence of a
going concern qualification in the company's financial statements is
called "normally decisive.1"136
131. FLA. STAT. § 607.06401(3).
132. "Insolvent" is generally defined in the definitions section of the Act to mean
inability of a corporation to pay debts as they become due in the usual course of its
business. Id. at § 607.01401(15). The Act inadvertently uses this full statement, rather
than using the defined term and simply stating that the distribution must not render
the corporation "insolvent."
133. Changes to the Model Business Corporation Act-Amendments to Finan-
cial Provisions, 34 Bus. LAW. 1867, 1881 (1979).
134. RMBCA. supra note 4, at § 6.40 (official comment).
135. Id.
136. Id. The official comment states that: "Indeed, in the case of a corporation
having regularly audited financial statements, the absence of any qualification in the
most recent auditor's opinion as to the corporation's status as a 'going concern,' coupled
with a lack of subsequent adverse events, would normally be decisive." This issue cer-
tainly will not arise unless subsequent adverse events occur-the author assumes that
the drafters meant a lack of subsequent adverse events before the measuring date of
the distribution, because the directors should not be accountable for unforeseeable
events subsequent to that date. See also Current Issues on the Legality of Dividends
from a Law and Accounting Perspective: A Task Force Report, 39 Bus. LAW. 289, 306
(1983) (suggesting a presumption against insolvency if the corporation receives an au-
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If the corporation is "encountering difficulties, or is in an uncer-
tain position concerning its liquidity and operations," the directors
should carefully document the basis for their decision as they would
other potentially controversial actions.137 The comment emphasizes
that, consistent with the standard for their actions in section 8.30 of the
RMBCA (section 607.0830), directors may rely on reports from man-
agement, accountants, and other persons and may make judgments or
assumptions regarding the corporation's future that are "customarily
justified, absent clear evidence to the contrary."' 38 The comment states
that having made these judgments and relied on information made
available to them, directors "should not, of course, be held responsible
as a matter of hindsight for unforeseen developments.' 3 9
The comment contains somewhat helpful examples of assumptions
regarding product demand, short-term indebtedness, and contingent li-
abilities that may be made by directors in evaluating whether a distri-
bution will render the corporation insolvent and that should be re-
viewed carefully by counsel advising the corporation on this issue.'
40
For example, with respect to contingent liabilities, it states: "[t]o the
extent that the corporation may be subject to asserted or unasserted
contingent liabilities, reasonable judgments as to the likelihood,
amount, and time of any recovery against the corporation, after giving
consideration to the extent to which the corporation is insured or other-
wise protected from loss, may be utilized."'' The obvious problem,
notwithstanding the comment, is that directors' judgments might look
unreasonable to a trier of fact if the contingent liabilities that were
thought unlikely to result in liability become real liabilities.
The second prong is a balance sheet test, a limitation based on a
comparison following the transfer of the corporation's assets to its lia-
bilities plus the amount of any liquidation preference of senior equity
holders.' 42 Simply stated, the corporation may make distributions to its
shareholders only to the extent of its net worth, plus the liquidation
preferences. For distributions payable to any but the most senior class
of stock, the preferential amount payable to relatively more senior clas-
ditor's opinion not subject to a going concern opinion).





142. FLA. STAT. § 607.06401(3)(b).
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ses of preferred stock must be added to liabilities to determine whether
the distribution is permitted. 143 In comparison, the former law com-
pared liabilities to assets plus stated capital and reserved and restricted
surplus. The Act eliminates the amount of stated capital, and reserved
and restricted surplus from the formulation, and adds the liquidation
preference. The Act accords flexibility; the balance sheet may be "pre-
pared on the basis of accounting practices and principles that are rea-
sonable in the circumstances or on a fair valuation or other method
that is reasonable in the circumstances."' 44 The Act does not mandate
generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) and continues to al-
low a fair market valuation. 145
Again, the official comment to section 6.40 of the RMBCA clari-
fies that directors may rely on opinions, reports, or statements, includ-
ing audited financial statements and other financial data in making this
prong of the determination. 46 The comment introduces a safe harbor
to assure those troubled by the uncertainty of the "reasonableness"
standard-use of GAAP is always reasonable under the circum-
stances.' 47 Also, the corporation may rely on its last balance sheet "un-
less the board is then aware that it would be unreasonable to rely on
the financial statements because of newly-discovered or subsequently
arising facts or circumstances.' 48
The comment recognizes that use of GAAP, or other accounting
principles, might result in an overstatement of assets' value:' 49
Accordingly, the revised Model Business Corporation Act contem-
plates that generally accepted accounting principles arc: always
'reasonable in the circumstances' and that other accounting princi-
ples may be perfectly acceptable, under a general standard of rea-
143. Id. at § 607.06401.
144. Id. at § 607.06401(4).
145. The former law also allowed a fair market valuation. FLA. STAT. §
607.137(7) (1989) (repealed 1990).
146. RMBCA, supra note 4, at § 6.40 (official comments 2, 4).
147. Id. (official comments 3, 4).
148. Id.; see also Baxter v. Lancer Indus., Inc., 213 F. Supp. 92 (E.D.N.Y.
1963). The Baxter court considered the former law and held that a corporation could
not base the balance sheet determination whether dividends were permitted solely on its
financial statements. The court stated that "[w]hat little authority there is suggests
that actual values, albeit conservatively applied, rather than book values, are determi-
native of the existence of surplus." Baxter, 213 F. Supp. at 95. Certainly, this holding
is no longer good law.
149. RMBCA, supra note 4, at § 6.40 (official comments 2, 3, 4).
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sonableness, even if they do not involve the fair value' or current
value concepts that are contemplated by section [607.06401(4)].150
The RMBCA thereby avoids forcing directors to evaluate whether the
financial statements were overstating value at the time of each distribu-
tion and inserting judicial oversight into accounting practice.151 Even
though the comment seems to sanction systems that overvalue assets
based on a cost rather than fair value system, directors of corporations
with financial statements not within the GAAP safe harbor might be
wise to confirm that the fair value of assets roughly approximates book
value, to avoid a charge that the accounting method was not reasonable
under the circumstances. Although ordinarily not a concern, this point
might be especially relevant in this time of declining asset prices.
The official comment also confirms that asset valuations may be
made using a going concern valuation rather than a liquidation valua-
tion, unless the corporation is selling its assets.1 52 This conclusion might
not follow from a reasoned assessment. Typically, going concern values
will be difficult to attain if the corporation's financial condition is seri-
ously troubled and it needs to sell assets quickly. Yet, this point is the
only one at which creditors will look to asset values for recovery of.
amounts due them. The going concern valuation test virtually assures
that actual asset recoveries will be insufficient, unless the going concern
valuations substantially exceed liabilities. To the extent that a distribu-
tion is based on a current asset valuation, this fact must be specifically
identified and the amount per share paid on the basis of the valuation
disclosed to shareholders when the distribution is made.153
150. Id. (emphasis added).
151. See Current Issues on the Legality of Dividends from a Law and Account-
ing Perspective: A Task Force Report, 39 Bus. LAW. 289 (1983). The article recom-
mended creation of the safe harbor for GAAP principles:
It appears to the task force that when it comes to applying statutory finan-
cial tests to dividend declarations, corporate directors are in the same posi-
tion as the courts: they are generally not trained or competent to be re-
sponsible for accounting standards that represent extremely complex
assumptions and judgments .... [W]e question whether it is reasonable
for the statute to require a director to make a judgment among accounting
principles.
Id. at 300.
152. RMBCA, supra note 4, at § 6.40 (official comments 2, 3, 4).
153. FLA. STAT. § 607.06401(4). This identification language was added to the
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Section 607.06401(6) and (8) sets forth straightforward rules for
determining the dates on which the effect of a distribution should be
measured."" These dates depend on the nature of the distribution (divi-
dend or repurchase) and the consideration paid (cash/property or
debt) .1 5 In the case of stock repurchases for debt, the effect of the
transaction generally will be measured when the transaction occurs
(the earlier of the date the debt is incurred or the date the shareholder
ceases to be a shareholder) and not when the debt is paid." '6 This result
reverses Florida precedent that precluded a corporation from paying
debt incurred in connection with a share purchase if the corporation
was insolvent when payment of the debt was due. 151 Section
607.06401(8) provides that indebtedness may be disregarded for pur-
poses of determining whether a distribution is permitted, if expressly
made payable only to the extent that its payment at that time would be
a permitted distribution. In that instance only, each payment of princi-
pal and interest of the indebtedness will be considered a separate distri-
bution, the effect of which is measured on the date that it is made. This
provision facilitates an agreement to repurchase significant blocks of
shares with deferred payments at a price that exceeds the corporation's
net worth, without violating the balance sheet restriction. However, the
corporation must be able to comply with both elements of the restric-
tions on distributions when the payments are actually made.
154. FLA. STAT. § 607.06401(6), (8) (1990).
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. One court has held:
Promises to repurchase, such as that involved in the instant case, must be
viewed as conditioned by the requirement that, at the time the corporation
is called on to perform, it must have sufficient funds so that disbursement
for the repurchase will not involve the use of funds not authorized to be so
used by the applicable state law.
Baxter, 213 F. Supp. at 96 (applying Florida law); see also In re Charter Co., 68
Bankr. 225 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1986) (applying Florida law); In re Charter Co., 63
Bankr. 680 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1986) (applying Florida law). The court essentially held
in the two Charter Co. cases that the corporation must be solvent both when the debt is
incurred and when it is paid. Cf. Williams v. Nevelow, 513 S.W.2d 535 (Tex. 1974)
(payment considered made when note delivered; secured note enforceable even though
corporation insolvent when note payment due).
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IX. SHARE ACQUISITIONS AND TREASURY SHARES (SECTIONS
607.0603 AND 607.0631)
Section 607.0631, concerning share reacquisitions, departs from
the former law in two significant respects: it revises the rules governing
the corporation's repurchases of its own shares; and it generally elimi-
nates "treasury shares" and characterizes reacquired shares as author-
ized but unissued shares.15 8 Share repurchases are now governed by the
general rules set forth in section 607.06401 applicable to all share-
holder distributions, which scrap limitations based on the preservation
of stated capital in favor of the much simpler equity insolvency and net
worth insolvency tests.' 59
Shares that are reacquired or redeemed generally will be simply
designated as authorized but unissued shares, with no distinction from
shares that have never been issued. 16 0 The Act also adds clarifying lan-
guage from the Virginia corporate statute providing that acquired
shares constitute authorized but unissued shares of the same class, but
undesignated as to series.' 6 ' This rule makes sense; the shares should
not be designated as part of the same series, because series terms are
usually established when shares of the series were initially issued, based
on market conditions at that time. Treasury shares were generally elim-
inated under the RMBCA because the drafters perceived no substan-
tive difference between reacquired shares and shares that had never
been issued. 162
158. FLA. STAT. § 607.0631 (1990).
159. Id. at § 607.06401. The restrictions on share repurchases and redemptions
under the former law were set forth in section 607.017. See FLA. STAT. § 607.017
(1989) (repealed 1990). Generally, the corporation's right to repurchase its own shares
is subject to restrictions imposed by federal and state securities laws and fiduciary duty
obligations.
160. FLA. STAT. §§ 607.0603(1), .0631(1).
161. VA. CODE. ANN. § 13.1-652.A (1950).
162. RMBCA, supra note 4, at § 6.03 (official comment). Under the former law,
"treasury shares" were issued and outstanding shares that the corporation reacquired,
but did not cancel and restore to the status of authorized but unissued shares. FLA.
STAT. § 607.004(18) (1989) (repealed 1990). Until canceled, the shares were consid-
ered issued (but not outstanding) and their aggregate par value included in stated capi-
tal. See B. MANNING & J. HANKS, supra note 64, at 84-86 (briefly discussing the
complexities and problems caused by reacquired shares before the RMBCA, note 4.
"The entire topic of share reacquisition, treasury shares, resale, retirement and the like
is technical and sorely vexed under the legal capital statutes and under accounting
practice and generalization is not reliable.").
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The historical notes accompanying section 6.03 observe that the
concept of treasury shares initially arose as a mechanism -to evade re-
strictions on share issuance, such as those associated with par value and
preemptive rights. With the elimination of the legal significance of par
value and the general decline in the use of preemptive rights, treasury
shares no longer serve these purposes. This change eliminates an entry
on the corporation's balance sheet for "treasury shares," unless use of
treasliry shares is retained.
In section 607.0631, the Act adds to the core text of section 6.31
of the RMBCA provisions that the corporation may retain treasury
shares in two instances: through an express provision to that effect in
its articles of incorporation; or by not canceling or disposing of shares
that constituted treasury shares before July 1, 1990, the effective date
of the Act.16 3 A corporation might elect to retain the status of acquired
shares as treasury shares to avoid paying listing fees again when it reis-
sues them.16 4
In one instance, the corporation's authorized shares are reduced by
the number of repurchased shares - if the corporation's articles of
incorporation prohibit reissue of acquired shares. This reduction be-
comes effective when an amendment to the articles of incorporation is
filed with the Department of State. According to the comment to 6.31
of the RMBCA, during the interim period before this amendment is
filed, the shares may be issued and if issued will constitute valid shares
in the hands of purchasing shareholders.' 65However, any such issuance
would violate the prohibition on reissue in the articles of incorporation
and probably constitute an improper action by the board of directors. 6
X. CONCLUSION
Chapter VI of the Act simplifies and clarifies Florida law gov-
163. FLA. STAT. § 607.0631(1), (4).
164. Id. at § 607.0603(1). This section concerns the same matter, and was de-
rived without modification from § 6.03 of the RMBCA. It states, inconsistently with
section 607.0631, that without any exception, issued shares are "outstanding shares
until they are reacquired, redeemed, converted, or canceled." Id. A proposal to amend
this section to clarify that this general rule is subject to the exceptions for treasury
shares in section 607.0631(1) and (4) is pending as part of the Second Corrections Bill.
165. RMBCA, supra note 4, at § 6.31 (official comment).
166. Id. at § 6.31 (official comment 2) (The author wolld not render an opinion
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erning capital structure, share issuances, and distributions. The Act
adopts the RMBCA, except for several instances in which it diverges
from the uniform provisions, principally to facilitate anti-takeover mea-
sures. The result-a much improved law that should make Florida an
attractive place of incorporation.
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